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INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from a negligence case.
In early 2013, a United Parcel Service (“UPS”) truck driver backed up and crashed
his/her tractor-trailer into the loading dock at the warehouse of KNS International, L.L.C.
(“KNS”). The collision damaged the loading bay’s concrete and partially dislodged and
loosened some bolts to an overhead vinyl curtain and fixation system. KNS discovered
the damage and tightened some of the loosened bolts, but did not fix the concrete nor
replace the one or two bolts which had fallen out.
One week to a month after the UPS driver hit the KNS docking bay, the vinyl
curtain dislodged from the damaged concrete and fell on Plaintiff Stuart Wood,
permanently injuring him. The Woods then filed claims against both KNS and UPS.
UPS moved for summary judgment on two grounds 1) UPS owed no duty to Mr.
Wood because UPS did not own the KNS property and 2) KNS’s actions constituted an
intervening cause as a matter of law. In response, the Woods 1) discussed UPS’s duty, 2)
showed the UPS truck driver acted negligently when he/she hit the docking bay hard, 3)
explained that UPS’s actions caused the vinyl curtain to eventually fall, and 4)
demonstrated that the injury to Mr. Wood was foreseeable. The Woods also discussed
how KNS’s actions could only be an intervening cause as a matter of law if the
undisputed facts showed KNS actions “were in hindsight extraordinary.”
The district court granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment. In that ruling, the
district court did not rule that the Woods had not established a prima facia case of
negligence against UPS. Nor did the district court rule that UPS owed no duty to Mr.
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Wood. To the contrary, the district court recognized such a duty existed initially.
Nevertheless, the district court ruled as a matter of law that 1) UPS’s duty “ended” when
KNS became aware of the damage UPS caused to its building and 2) UPS’s actions could
not be the proximate cause of Mr. Wood’s injury; without explicitly saying so, the district
court in essence ruled that KNS’s actions were an intervening act relieving UPS of
responsibility. In short, the district court denied the Woods a jury trial by making the
factual determination that a reasonable jury could only conclude that KNS’s actions after
UPS caused the damage were in hindsight “extraordinary”—the key standard in this
case—and therefore an intervening cause as a matter of law.
As discussed in this brief, the district court’s decision was wrong for three reasons.
First, UPS owed a duty to Mr. Wood to use reasonable care in the operation of its truck to
avoid creating a dangerous condition on property which could injure Mr. Wood. Second,
the Woods provided ample evidence to support a jury verdict against UPS 1) for
breaching UPS’s standard of care and 2) establishing UPS’s actions proximately caused
Mr. Wood’s injury. Third, UPS did not provided facts sufficient for the district court to
take the intervening cause issue away from the jury. The facts relied on by UPS below
are insufficient for the district court to conclude that all reasonable jurors would have
found that KNS’s actions were, in hindsight, “extraordinary” or “highly extraordinary.”
While the district court obviously felt this way, the district court erred by supplanting its




STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION
The Woods challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
UPS on these three issues: first, whether UPS had a duty to use reasonable care when
backing its truck to not create a dangerous condition on property; second, whether the
Woods established a prima facie case of negligence against UPS; and third, whether the
district court correctly took the issue of causation away from the jury and found that an
intervening cause cut off UPS’s liability as a matter of law.
Summary judgment standard of review: The court of appeals “review[s] the
district court's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, affording the trial
court no deference. An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Torrie v. Weber County., 2013 UT 48, ¶ 7, 309 P.3d 216 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, our supreme court has explained that “summary
judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.” Dwiggins v.
Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted).
ISSUE 1: Does UPS owe a Duty to Use Reasonable Care in the Operation
of its Trucks to Avoid Creating a Dangerous Condition on Property Which Could
Injure Users of that Property?
Standard of Review: “[W]hether a duty exists is a question of law which we
review for correctness.” Wood v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2016 UT App 112, ¶ 8, 374 P.3d
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1080 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
existence of a duty is a question of law which is “determined on a categorical basis” for a
given class of cases rather than on those cases individual facts or the “specific mechanism
of the harm.” B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 25, 275 P.3d 228.
Preservation: The Woods preserved this claim by opposing UPS’s motion for
summary judgment and specifically arguing that a duty existed as part of their summary
judgment briefing and argument. Appellate Record (“R”) 1059, 60. Cf Heritagewest Fed.
Credit Union v. Workman, 2010 UT App 342 (per curiam) (unpublished) (explaining that
Appellant failed to preserve a claim against summary judgment “[b]ecause [he] failed to
oppose the motion for summary judgment.”)
ISSUE 2: Did the Woods present a prima facia negligence case against
UPS?
Standard of Review: “A prima facie case of negligence requires a showing of: (1)
a duty of reasonable care extending to plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and
actual causation of the injury; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiff.” Clark v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 600–01 (Utah Ct. App 1995) (citations omitted).
Preservation: The lower court did not address this issue, but it was raised in the
responsive memorandum filed by Plaintiffs. R 1059, 60.
ISSUE 3: Under the facts in this case, could a reasonable jury only
conclude with the benefit of hindsight that KNS’s actions were so “extraordinary”
as to constitute an intervening cause, cutting off UPS’s negligence liability as a
matter of law?
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Standard of Review: Because “summary judgment is appropriate in negligence
cases only in the clearest instances,” Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183, this court has explained
that “‘[i]t is only when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn therefrom’ that proximate cause becomes a question of law.” Kranendonk v.
Gregory & Swapp, PLLC, 2014 UT App 36, ¶ 20, 320 P.3d 689 (quoting Apache Tank
Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.3d 614, 615 (Utah 1985)). Otherwise, questions of “breach
and proximate cause are questions of fact for the fact finder determined on a case-specific
basis.” Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 25. In Utah, “[a] superseding cause, sufficient to become the
proximate cause of the final result and relieve defendant of liability for his original
negligence arises only when an intervening force was unforeseeable and may be
described with the benefit of hindsight, as extraordinary.” Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt.
Corp., 820 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of
America, Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. 1990)).
Preservation: The Woods preserved their causation claim by opposing UPS’s
motion for summary judgment and arguing that UPS breached its duty to Mr. Wood as
part of their summary judgment briefing and argument. R 1054–1059. Cf Heritagewest,
2010 UT App 342 (per curiam).
JURISDICTION: This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103
because the case arises from a final order over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction but was transferred to the Court of Appeals. Appellant’s
docketing statement contains a thorough explanation of how the district court’s grant of
summary judgment became a final, appealable order.
x
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History: This appeal stems from a negligence case brought by the
Woods against UPS (the party which caused the dangerous condition) and KNS (the
party on whose property the condition existed) after a heavy vinyl curtain fell on Mr.
Wood’s head, permanently injuring him. Following the close of fact discovery, UPS
moved for summary judgment. R 342. The Woods opposed the motion, UPS replied, and
oral argument was scheduled for September 10, 2017. R 1036–1154; 1165–1210; 1235–
36. Both sides appeared at the hearing and argued their respective positions. R 1659.
Ruling from the bench, the district court ultimately granted UPS’s motion for two
reasons: first, the district court found that UPS’s “duty ended when KNS became aware
of the defect upon its building,” R 1720:13–14; and second, the district court found “that
the injury to Mr. Wood . . . was not proximately caused by UPS’s damage to the
building.” R 1720:22–24. Tellingly, the district court noted that the proximate cause issue
was “a very close question legally.” R 1724:12–13
The court’s oral ruling was later captured in a written order entered on November
20, 2017. R 1765–67. On the duty issue, the district court stated the following:
Based on the undisputed facts, summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of
law, because UPS owed no duty to the plaintiffs at the time of injury. UPS’s duty
ended when KNS became aware of the damage UPS caused to its building. At that
time, KNS was in a superior position to repair the damage and defects to the
building, or restrict access to the bay so that it could not be used. At this point,
UPS had no further duty to people injured by the damage it caused to the building.
R 1766.
On the proximate cause issue, the district court stated the following:
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Summary judgment in favor of UPS is also appropriate because the injury to Mr.
Wood was not proximately caused by the damage UPS caused to the building. The
defective property was in the sole possession of KNS for one week to one month
before the injury to Mr. Wood occurred. If KNS was negligent in not repairing the
door, or in the manner in which it repaired the door, there is intervening
negligence by KNS that causes the injury to Mr. Wood. Alternatively, if KNS
repaired the door in a manner that was reasonable and not negligent, no party’s
negligence caused the injury to Mr. Wood. Under either scenario, UPS did not
proximately cause Mr. Wood’s injury, and cannot be liable as a matter of law. R
1766–67.
Importantly, the district court did not reference Utah’s “extraordinary” standard or
otherwise discuss the foreseeability of KNS’s actions—the necessary hurdles for a ruling
as a matter of law on a proximate cause issue for intervening cause in Utah.
Following UPS’s dismissal on summary judgment, the Woods and KNS reached a
settlement, and on January 3, 2018, KNS was dismissed from the case. R 2136–38; 2155–
2159. At that point, no defendants remained in the case, and the district court’s prior
summary judgment ruling in favor of UPS became a final appealable order. See
Docketing Statement. The Woods filed a notice of appeal two days later. R 2166–67.1
Factual background:
Background Facts:
KNS has been in business since 2001. R 1071:9–10. KNS fulfills customer orders
from website purchases mainly involving women’s fashion apparel and shoes. R 1067–
68. In 2012–2013, KNS operated and managed a warehouse from which it would receive
1 The Wood’s also filed a Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment which was
withdrawn after the Wood’s learned that KNS would be dismissed from the case, making
the court’s earlier, non-final summary judgment ruling in favor of UPS a final, appealable
order. R 2147; see Docketing Statement.
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and distribute its products. R 1071:13–15. Mike Kelly, the current President of KNS,
identified this warehouse as Building 3, shown below. R 1070:13–14. The KNS
warehouse has a docking bay designed to receive trucks, and in particular, receive the
trailers of tractor trailers. R 1072:7–1073:23; 1821:24–1822:13. Docking Bays A and B
in Building 3 are shown below, R 1037–38:
.
Docking Bay B Docking Bay A
TJ Barney was an employee of KNS from late 2007 through early to mid-2013.
R 1085:5–10. During part of his tenure at KNS, Mr. Barney worked as an assistant
manager/supervisor/assistant warehouse manager. R 1085:12–21. He had responsibility
over a number of KNS employees. R 1086:20–1087:22. After September 1, 2011, but
before Mr. Wood was injured, KNS installed a number of vinyl curtains on its warehouse
doors including a vinyl curtain on the outside of the door for Docking Bay B. R 1089:14–
1091:17. A photograph of the vinyl curtain from Docking Bay B is show below, R 1038:
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The vinyl curtain components included a metal bracket with 16 bolt holes. R
1096:10–20. Mr. Barney helped install some of the vinyl curtains. R 1090:5–6. Mr.
Barney testified about how KNS installed the vinyl curtains over the warehouse doors:
-KNS used the bracket bolt holes to measure where to place the bolts;
-KNS hammer drilled 16 holes into the cinderblock;
-KNS then placed the bracket to line up with the bolt holes;
-KNS drilled the bolts through the metal bracket into the concrete;
-KNS then placed the vinyl stripping over the small extended posts; and
-KNS secured the vinyl stripping with a nut.
R 1090:5–1091:17; R 1093:9–1099:1. Mr. Barney testified there were no problems with
the installation of the vinyl curtains. R 1098:6-14.
A UPS Tractor-Trailer Crashed Into Docking Bay B Causing Structural Damage to the
Vinyl Curtain Bracketing/Bolting System and the Concrete Holding the Vinyl Curtain.
Mr. Barney was working in the KNS warehouse when he heard a “bad bang.”
R 1099:22–1100:10; 1101:20–1102:22. Mr. Barney felt the building shake because the
building had been hit so hard. R 1103:2-10. Mr. Barney described the impact as “like a
mini bomb went off.” R 1113:1–2. The “bad bang” occurred after KNS installed the
vinyl curtains. R 1099:22–1100:2. After Mr. Barney walked over to the source of the
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“bad bang,” he saw that a UPS tractor-trailer had backed down Docking Bay B and had
hit the KNS building. R 1099:20–1100:24: R 1112:16–25. Mr. Barney knew it was a UPS
tractor-trailer that had hit the KNS building because he testified, “I was standing there
and it was a UPS truck that was there after the building shook.” R 1109: 19–23. Mr.
Barney also talked to the UPS driver about hitting the building. R 1109:22–1110:13.
After the collisions, Mr. Barney saw the “cinderblock” holding the vinyl curtain had
cracked. R 1113: 7–12. Mr. Barney also saw that one or two of the bolts holding the
vinyl curtain had fallen out of the concrete. R 1108:12–17; R 1105:25–1106:15. Mr.
Barney testified that the concrete holding the vinyl curtain would no longer hold the one
or two bolts which had come out of the vinyl curtain bracket. R 1105:12–24.
Mr. Barney testified he had to tighten one or two other bolts which had loosened
because of the UPS truck’s collision with the KNS building. R 1106:16–1108:11. Mr.
Barney guessed the UPS truck hit the KNS building “multiple weeks” before the vinyl
curtain bracket fell on Mr. Wood’s head. R 1104:9–20. Mr. Barney testified, to the best
of his recollection, that the UPS tractor-trailer hit the KNS building one week to one
month before the vinyl curtain fell on Mr. Wood. R 1104:9–20. Prior to the UPS
collision, Mr. Barney had constantly inspected the KNS building and he had not seen any
damage around Docking Bay B before the UPS truck had hit the KNS building. R
1103:23–1104:25. Mr. Barney concluded the UPS tractor-trailer had caused the damage
to the KNS building because 1) the tractor-trailer hit the building “so hard” and 2) he
personally observed the damage after the UPS tractor-trailer hit the KNS building. R
1102:23–1103:14; 1111:18–25; 1112:16–1113:3. Mr. Barney believed that after he had
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tightened the bolts he felt the vinyl curtain was “secure enough at least for my liking.” R
1113:15–1114:4.
The UPS Tractor-Trailer That Hit the KNS Building Broke Both UPS’s and Common
Safety Rules.
UPS uses tractors to deliver the UPS trailers. R 1073:24–1075:13. UPS produced
David Keeling as a UPS 30(b)(6) witness. Mr. Keeling is UPS’s Global Health and
Safety Compliance Director. R 1117; 1120:5–8. Mr. Keeling testified he was prepared
to testify concerning the safety rules used by UPS tractor-trailer drivers when backing
into a building. R 1121:23–1122:2. Mr. Keeling testified that UPS tractor-trailer drivers,
when backing their tractor-trailers, must follow certain rules. These rules include the
following:
a. A UPS driver must do “a controlled back,” R 1125:5–7;
b. A UPS driver must not go fast when backing, R 1125:5–7; and
c. A UPS driver backing to a dock must get out and check the distance if
he/she is unsure of where his/her trailer is in relation to the dock. R 1126:1–
16.
Mr. Keeling testified that UPS’s backing safety rules are designed to prevent
injury to people, the building/dock and the UPS trailer. R 1125:5–15; 1127:15–1128:3.
UPS assumes a UPS driver is not backing properly if the UPS driver’s trailer hits a
building so hard that it causes structural damage to the building. R 1123:8–16. UPS
cannot think of any circumstance under which a UPS driver would hit a building hard if
the UPS driver is following UPS’s rules for safe backing. R 1128:10–1129:2. UPS
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agrees that it is possible to cause structural damage to a building if the driver hits a
building hard enough. R 1123:17–1124:4.
The UPS Tractor-Trailer Collision with KNS’s Building at Docking Bay B Caused the
Vinyl Curtain To Eventually Detach From the Concrete and Hit Mr. Wood on the Head.
Mr. Wood was injured on February 4, 2013 when the vinyl curtain in Docking Bay
B detached from the concrete and fell on Mr. Wood’s head as he was delivering packages
to KNS. R 1134:23–1135:13; 1136:1–25. That day, KNS warehouse manager Gavin
Thain looked at the concrete after the vinyl curtain bracket detached from the top of
Docking Bay B. See R 1144:3–8. Mr. Thain believed the damage caused to the concrete
by the UPS truck backing into the KNS building ultimately caused the vinyl curtain
bracket to fall. R 1142:15–1144:8. None of the other vinyl curtains installed by KNS
failed or had any problems except the bracket and curtain assembly struck by UPS. R
1149:3–14.
Scott Kimbrough, Plaintiff’s expert, submitted a report which explained his belief
that UPS’s collision with the KNS building caused the vinyl curtain bracket to fall on Mr.
Wood. R 1899–1900; 1908–1918.
UPS Relies Upon the Following Three Facts to Assert KNS’s Actions Constitute an
“Intervening Act” Sufficient to Cut Off UPS’s Own Negligence.
First, KNS through Mr. Barney knew before the vinyl curtain fell on Mr. Wood
that a UPS tractor-trailer had caused significant damage to the vinyl curtain
bracketing/bolting system and the concrete holding the vinyl curtain and that Mr. Barney
had attempted to fix the bracket. See e.g. R 1099:22–1100:10; 1101:20–1102:22: R
1109:22–1110:13. R 1108:12–17; R 1105:25–1106:15.
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Second, on February 4, 2013, before the vinyl curtain bracket fell on Mr. Wood,
Mike Kelly, the now President of KNS, saw the vinyl curtain bracket in Docking Bay B
hanging down. R 423:16–23; 425:1–426:12. Mr. Kelly described it as follows:
Q. You saw [the vinyl curtain bracket] was hanging down. How far
was it hanging down?
A. Rough guessing, an inch and a half.
Q. How much of the bracket was hanging down?
A. Not a very—guessing, once again, maybe a foot.
Q. So a foot was hanging down at an angle?
A. Yeah, 8 to 12 inches, roughly, yea. Yes, it was hanging down at an
angle.
R 425:15–23. Mr. Kelly proceeded to drive away from the KNS facility without telling
anyone about the damage and the curtain “because no one should have been there and I
didn’t think that there was any risk of it hanging down because . . . there’s a lot of bolts
holding it . . . I never would have thought it would have fallen.” R 426:17–22.
Third, after the vinyl curtain bracket fell on Mr. Wood, Mr. Wood overheard a
KNS employee state as follows:
Gavin, yeah. He was cleaning me up. He was washing me off, and the
older guy, gray hair, the owner—I think he’s the owner—was there with
him. He was talking about how Gavin was-used to be a surgery assistant
and I was in good hands. He was washing all the blood off my face and
cleaning me up. And CJ came in and was asking me if I was all right.
Told me he was sorry, that he knew that thing was going to fall. He
said we should have taken care of it. Then the older guy said we’re not
talking about that right now. He took him out.
R 970:15–25 (emphasis added).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred in three ways when it granted UPS’s motion for summary
judgment. The district court first erred when it ruled that UPS’s duty “ended” or
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otherwise held that UPS had no duty toward Mr. Wood or anyone else working at the
KNS facility to not create a dangerous condition on the property. The district court
second erred when it failed to realize that the Wood’s had established a prima facie case
of negligence, sufficient to bring the case to the fact-finder. The district court third erred
when it took the question of causation—including the specific issue of intervening
cause—away from the jury and held as a matter of law that UPS could not be liable for its
direct role in Mr. Wood’s injury.
First, this brief explains that the existence of a duty is purely a question of law.
The court conducts the duty analysis on a broad, categorical basis for all classes of
defendants similarly situated—not on a case-by-case basis. Here, that class of defendant
is truck or tractor-trailer drivers similar to the UPS driver that hit KNS’s building and
damaged the overhead bracket and curtain assembly. After analyzing the relevant policy
factors set forward by our supreme court, this court should hold that truck drivers (and
others similarly situated) owe a duty to not create a dangerous condition that could
potentially hurt others, even if that condition is created on another’s property. The
district court’s statement that UPS’s duty “ended” dealt with the issue of causation, not
duty.
Second, this brief outlines how the Woods established a Prima Facia negligence
case against UPS. The Woods have established that a duty existed; that UPS breached
that duty; that UPS’s breach was the proximate and actual cause of Mr. Wood’s injuries;
and that Mr. Wood has suffered substantial, permanent damages due to UPS’s
negligence.
xix
Third, this brief explains that in Utah, a district court cannot supplant its own
reasoning for the fact finders on an issue of proximate cause—specifically, whether
intervening cause existed—except in “extraordinary” or “highly extraordinary”
circumstances. The facts of this case are not “extraordinary” and intervening cause as a
matter of law is incorrect here. The three specific facts that UPS argues meets this
standard, 1) that Mr. Barney saw the damage and improperly fixed the bracket; 2) that
then KNS vice-president Mr. Kelly saw the bracket hanging down as he left to a meeting,
but decided to drive away anyways given his belief that no one would be working in that
area; and 3) that another employee commented after the accident that “he knew [the




I. Truck Drivers Have a Duty to Use Reasonable Care to Avoid Creating a
Dangerous Condition on Property Which Could Cause Injury to the
Property’s Users.
“In negligence cases, a duty is ‘an obligation, to which the law will give
recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.’”
B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 5 (quoting AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium
Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 321) (Utah 1997) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984))). “[W]e all generally have a
duty of due care in the performance of our affirmative acts . . . .” Graves v. North
Eastern Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 19, 345 P.3d 619.
The specific issue in this case is whether truck drivers have a legal obligation to
use reasonable care in the operation of their trucks to avoid creating dangerous conditions
on another’s property which can cause injury to the property users.
The Utah Supreme court in B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West outlined the factors the court
should use to determine whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff:
(1) whether the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct consists of an
affirmative act or merely an omission; (2) the legal relationship of the
parties; (3) the foreseeability or likelihood of injury; (4) public policy as to
which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury; and (5) other
general policy considerations.
2012 UT 11, ¶ 5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The court then discussed how these factors should be applied:
Not every factor is created equal, however. As we explain below, some
factors are featured heavily in certain types of cases, while other factors
play a less important, or different, role. . . . [T]he legal-relationship factor is
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typically a “plus’ factor—used to impose a duty where one would
otherwise not exist, such as where the act complained of is merely an
omission. . . . . [T]he final three factors . . . are typically “minus” factors—
used to eliminate a duty that would otherwise exist.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Applying these factors to this case establishes that UPS had a duty toward Mr.
Wood.
A. The Application of The Five West Factors Shows that UPS Owed a Duty to
Mr. Wood to Use Reasonable Care to Avoid Creating a Dangerous
Condition on KNS’s Property Which Could Injure Mr. Wood.
1. UPS’s Tortious Conduct Arose Out of UPS’s Affirmative Act.
“In almost every instance, an act carries with it a potential duty and resulting legal
accountability for that act.” Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, ¶ 10, 125 P.3d 906
(overruled on other grounds by Cope v. Utah Valley State College, 2014 UT 53, ¶ 27, 342
P.3d 243). “The long-recognized distinction between acts and omissions—or
misfeasance and nonfeasance—makes a critical difference and is perhaps the most
fundamental factor courts consider when evaluating duty.” West, 2012 UT at ¶ 7. “Acts
of misfeasance, or ‘active misconduct working positive injury to others,’ typically carry a
duty of care.” Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, UPS engaged in the affirmative act of backing its tractor-trailer into
the KNS dock. Applying this “most fundamental factor,” UPS therefore had a duty to
use reasonable care when backing so as not to injure people or damage property which
could then cause injury to others, including Mr. Wood. See id.
2. The Lack of a Special Relationship between UPS and Mr. Wood Did
Not Alter UPS’s Duty to Mr. Wood.
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The Utah Supreme Court recognizes a special relationship as a “plus” factor in
establishing a duty. However, “[o]utside the government context . . . a special
relationship is not typically required to sustain a duty of care to those who could
foreseeably be injured by the defendant’s affirmative acts.” West, 2012 UT at ¶ 10.
In this case, there is no special relationship between UPS and Mr. Wood. But the
lack of this special relationship does not eliminate UPS’s duty of care to Mr. Wood. Id.
at ¶ 19.
3. It is Foreseeable That UPS’s Affirmative Act Could Cause Injury to
a User of KNS’s Property.
The court in Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc, outlined the foreseeability
factor:
Foreseeability as a factor in determining duty does not relate to the specifics of the
alleged tortious conduct but rather to the general relationship between the alleged
tortfeasor and the victim. “Whether a harm was foreseeable in the context of
determining duty depends on the general foreseeability of such harm, not whether
the specific mechanism of the harm could be foreseen.” [citation omitted]; see also
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993) (“What is
necessary to meet the test of negligence . . . is that [the harm] be reasonably
foreseeable, not that the particular accident would occur, but only that there is a
likelihood of an occurrence of the same general nature.” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2009 UT 44, ¶ 20, 215 P.3d 152. The foreseeability factor focuses on the “general
foreseeability” of the harm, not the “specific mechanism” of harm. Id. In West, for
example, the court was faced with “whether healthcare providers have a legal obligation
to nonpatients to exercise reasonable care in prescribing medications that pose a risk of
injury to third parties.” 2012 UT at ¶ 5. The West court recognized that certain drugs,
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such as powerful narcotics, carry a highly foreseeable risk to third parties, while other,
“innocuous drugs,” do not. Id. at ¶ 28. The court nonetheless concluded that a duty exists
in both circumstances:
Because the class of cases includes some in which a risk of injury to third
parties is reasonably foreseeable (as even defendants concede), the
foreseeability factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty on healthcare
providers to exercise care in prescribing medications so as to refrain from
affirmatively causing injury to nonpatients. Whether in a particular case a
prescription creates a risk of sufficient foreseeability that the physician
should have exercised greater care to guard against injury is a question of
breach.
Id.
The same analysis applies to this case. Common experience establishes that a
large, heavy tractor-trailer striking a building hard can cause structural damage to that
building. UPS’s own corporate representative acknowledged that a driver can cause
structural damage if the driver hits the building hard enough. R 1123:17–1124:4.
It is equally common knowledge that a damaged or compromised building can
cause injury to people underneath that structure by something collapsing or falling on that
person. UPS would likely concede it is foreseeable that a truck or vehicle striking a
building might dislodge part of the building causing immediate injury to a third party.
Such general foreseeability is sufficient to establish a duty to all third parties who might
be injured by a compromised structure, whether the building part falls immediately or a
week or a month later. See Holcombe v. Nations Banc Fin. Serv. Corp., 248 VA 445,
448, 450 S.E. 2d 158 (1994) (denying summary judgment in a negligence case on the
issue of foreseeability because “[t]he fact, stressed by the defendant, that the [two heavy]
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partitions had remained in the bathroom for several months without incident does not
detract from the foreseeability of injury occurring, albeit the injury occurred later rather
than sooner” after the partition fell over and injured plaintiff.)
4. Public Policy Favors Finding a Duty in this Case.
The Court in West outlined the public policy factor:
[T]his factor considers whether the defendant is best situated to take
reasonable precautions to avoid injury. Typically, this factor would cut
against the imposition of a duty where a victim or some other third party is
in a superior position of knowledge or control to control or avoid the loss in
question.
2012 UT at ¶ 30.
In this case, UPS was in the best position to prevent the loss in the first place. The
UPS driver could have prevented this injury entirely if he/she had chosen to follow UPS’s
safety rules and backed his/her tractor-trailer at a slow speed. R 1125:5–7; 1126:1–16.
Instead, the driver choose to back his/her tractor-trailer into the building at a reckless rate
of speed, causing damage to the building and, eventually, to Mr. Wood. R 1123:8–16;
1128:10–1129:2.
5. Other Policies Favor Finding a Duty in this Case.
Other policy considerations weigh in favor of finding a duty in this case. In
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., this court recognized that “the public policy
behind tort law is to hold tortfeasors accountable for harms occasioned by their fault. . . .
Accordingly, as between an innocent party and a negligent tortfeasor, public policy
requires that any loss should be borne by the tortfeasor.” 2010 UT App at ¶ 4. In this
case, UPS acted negligently when it backed its truck into the docking bay and bracket
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assembly, and that negligence directly led to Mr. Wood’s injury. Not finding that UPS
has a duty to Mr. Wood puts the loss on the innocent party, Mr. Wood, rather than the
negligent tortfeasor who actually created the dangerous condition, UPS.
6. The District Court Actually Recognized UPS Had a Duty to
Mr. Wood, But Held That UPS’s Duty Ended When KNS
Discovered the Damage. Such a Ruling Is Simply a
Different Way of Saying KNS’s Actions Constituted an
Intervening Cause.
The consideration of all the above West factors establishes that UPS owed a duty
to Mr. Wood to use reasonable care to avoid creating a dangerous condition on property
which could injure Mr. Wood. In fact, the lower court recognized UPS had a duty to Mr.
Wood. The district court, however, ruled that UPS’s duty “ended when KNS became
aware of the damage UPS caused to its building.” R 1720; 1766.
The district court’s incorrectly labeled duty analysis was simply another way of
saying that KNS’s actions constituted an intervening cause. Section III, below, shows
how intervening cause is a fact issue for the jury not the court.
B. UPS’s Duty Is Consistent with The Restatement Second of Torts §§ 383,
385, and Utah Case Law Which Also Recognize that UPS Had a Duty to
Use Reasonable Care to Avoid Creating a Dangerous Condition on
Property Which Could Cause Mr. Wood Injury.
1. Section 383 Imposed a Duty on UPS to Use Reasonable Care
to Avoid Creating a Dangerous Condition on KNS’s Property
Which Could Cause Mr. Wood Injury.
Section 383 of the Restatement Second of Torts states:
One who does an act or carries on an activity upon land on behalf of the
possessor is subject to the same liability and enjoys the same freedom from
liability, for physical harm caused thereby to others upon and outside of the
land as though he were the possessor of the land.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 383. Utah law recognizes that a “[l]andowner may be
liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions which they create, and which they
should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” English
v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In such cases where the defendant
“created the condition . . . he is deemed to know of the condition and no further proof of
notice is necessary.” Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah
1975).
In this case, UPS came onto the land at the request of KNS. UPS’s obligation when
conducting activity on the land is the same as that for KNS: UPS must not create a
dangerous condition on another’s land which would expose others to an unreasonable risk
of harm. See English, 774 P.2d at 1156. UPS is responsible for any dangerous condition it
caused to the property whether it specifically knew about that dangerous condition or not.
Allen, 538 P.2d at 176. In this case, UPS created a dangerous condition by backing its
truck into and damaging the vinyl curtain bracketing system. UPS is responsible for
foreseeable injuries caused by that dangerous condition which it created at the KNS
docking bay. See id. The risk that a damaged overhead curtain could fall on someone
walking underneath is entirely foreseeable here.
2. Section 385 Imposed a Duty on UPS to Use Reasonable Care
to Avoid Creating a Dangerous Condition on Property Which
Could Cause Mr. Wood Injury.
Section 385 of the Restatement Second of Torts states:
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of
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the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the
structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor,
under the same rules as those determining the liability of one who as
manufacturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of
others.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 385. This liability arises even if the person creating the
dangerous condition does not know it created the dangerous condition: “neither a
negligent servant or contractor, nor a negligent manufacturer or repairman is relieved
from liability by the fact that he does not know of the dangerous condition of the land or
chattel.” Id., comment d.
In Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 199 UT 55, 985 P.2d 892, the Utah Supreme
Court adopted Section 385 as part of Utah’s common law. Id., ¶ 9. In Tallman, the
supreme court recognized that a party working on another’s property could be held liable
for the dangerous condition it created on the property. Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Russell
Sorensen Const., 2012 UT App 154, ¶¶ 24–25, 279 P.3d 422 (discussing Tallman’s
adoption of §385 and explaining that a contractor is directly liable for physical harm
caused by conditions that he created on the land).
UPS’s actions fall under the plain language of Section 385. UPS drove its trucks
onto KNS property “on behalf of” KNS. KNS requested that UPS pick up and deliver
packages at its warehouse. UPS “create[d]” a dangerous condition on KNS property
when it negligently backed hard into the KNS building causing structural damage to the
cinder block holding the vinyl curtain and the vinyl curtain’s fixation system. UPS’s
negligent driving weakened and compromised the cinder block holding the vinyl curtain
and the vinyl curtain bracketing system. The vinyl bracket and curtain eventually failed
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because of that damage and injured Mr. Wood. UPS owed a duty to Mr. Wood and other
potential victims.
II. The Woods Have Established a Viable Claim of Negligence Against UPS.
To establish a claim for negligence, the plaintiff must establish 1) defendant owed
plaintiff a duty of care, 2) defendant breached that duty and 3) the breach was the
proximate cause of 4) plaintiff’s injuries or damages. West, 2012 UT at ¶ 5, n. 2.
Plaintiff has demonstrated each of these elements against UPS for purposes of a summary
judgment motion.
A. UPS’s Drivers Have a Duty to Use Reasonable Care to Avoid Creating a
Dangerous Condition on Property Which Could Cause Injury to the
Property’s Users.
As discussed in Section I, above, the Woods have established that UPS owed a
duty of care.
B. The Woods Have Provided Evidence By Which a Jury Could Find UPS’s
Driver Breached His/Her Duty of Care to Mr. Wood When He/She
Negligently Backed Hard into KNS’s Docking Bay Damaging the Cinder
Block and the Vinyl Curtain Bracketing System Which Eventually Caused
the Vinyl Curtain to Fall on Mr. Wood.
1. The UPS Driver Negligently Backed Hard Into the KNS Building.
Mr. Barney, a KNS employee, testified he was working in the KNS building when
he heard a loud bang. Mr. Barney testified the building shook, and he described the
impact like a “mini-bomb.” R 1099:22–1100:10; 1101:20–1102:22. Mr. Barney
walked over to the bang’s source and saw a UPS driver had backed his tractor-trailer into
the KNS building. R 1099:20–1100:24: R 1112:16–25. Mr. Barney saw the UPS
driver’s tractor-trailer had caused structural damage to the KNS building and even talked
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to the driver about it. R 1109:22–1110:13; R 1106:16–1108:11; R 1104:9–20. R 1104:9–
20.
A UPS driver must follow the following safety rules when backing a tractor
trailer:
1. A UPS driver must do a controlled back;
2. A UPS driver must not go fast when backing; and
3. A UPS driver backing to a dock must get out and check the distance if
he/she is unsure of where his/her trailer is in relation to the dock.
R 1125:5–7; R 1126:1–16.
UPS testified that UPS would assume a UPS tractor trailer driver was backing
improperly if the UPS driver’s trailer hit the building so hard it caused structural damage.
R 1117; 1120:5–8. R 1121:23–1122:2; R 1123:8–16. Moreover, UPS could not think of
any circumstances under which a UPS tractor-trailer driver would hit a building hard if
he/she was following UPS’s rules for safe backing. R 1128:10–1129:2.
A jury could easily find the UPS driver breached its duty to use reasonable care
when backing his/her tractor-trailer toward the KNS building.
2. The UPS Driver’s Actions Created a Dangerous Condition on KNS’s
Property.
Mr. Barney testified he had inspected the KNS building before the UPS tractor-
trailer hit the KNS building and he had not seen any damage around Docking Bay B. R
1103:23–1104:25. Mr. Barney testified the UPS tractor-trailer collision damaged the
vinyl curtain bracketing/bolting system and compromised the concrete holding the vinyl
11
curtain. R 1113: 7–12. R 1108:12–17; R 1105:25–1106:15. Mr. Barney testified he saw
1) one or two of the bracketing bolts had come out of the bracket and had fallen to the
floor, 2) that one or two of the bracketing bolts were loose, and 3) the cinderblock
holding the vinyl curtain was cracked. Facts Id. Mr. Barney concluded the UPS tractor
trailer caused the damage to the KNS building because 1) the UPS tractor trailer hit the
KNS building hard and 2) the damage was observed after the UPS tractor trailer hit the
KNS building. R 1102:23–1103:14; 1111:18–25; 1112:16–1113:3.
Mr. Thain testified the damage caused to the concrete by the UPS tractor-trailer
backing into the KNS building ultimately caused the vinyl curtain bracket to fall. R
1149:3–14. The Wood’s expert, Scott Kimbrough, will testify that UPS’s collision with
KNS’s building caused the vinyl curtain bracket to fall on Mr. Wood. R 1899–1900;
1908–1918.
Using the available evidence, a jury could easily find that the UPS driver created a
dangerous condition on KNS’s property.
C. The Woods Have Provided Sufficient Evidence by Which a Jury Could
Find UPS’s Negligent Backing was the Proximate Cause of Mr. Wood’s
Injury.
Causation in negligence cases consists of two requirements. First the person’s act
produced the harm directly or set in motion events that produced the harm in a “natural
and continuous sequence,” without which the injury or result would not have occurred.
Magana v. Dave Roth Constr., 2009 UT 45, ¶ 27, 215 P.2d 143. This is also known as
“but for” causation. Second, the person’s act or failure to act could be foreseen by a
reasonable person to produce a harm of the same general nature. Steffensen v. Smith’s
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Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993). This is known as proximate, or legal,
causation.
1. UPS’s Damage to KNS’s Docking Bay B In Fact Caused the
Vinyl Curtain to Fall on Mr. Wood.
Plaintiffs have provided ample evidence that UPS’s driver caused the vinyl curtain
to fall. Said another way, but for UPS hitting the building, the bracket would have never
fallen on Mr. Wood’s head. Mr. Barney’s testified a UPS tractor-trailer hit Docking Bay
B hard. R 1099:22–1100:10; 1101:20–1102:22. The UPS driver’s negligence damaged
the vinyl curtain’s bracketing/bolting system and the concrete holding the bracketing
system, causing one or two bolts from the vinyl curtain bracket to fall out and one or two
bolts to loosen. R 1108:12–17; R 1105:25–1106:15; 1106:16–1108:11. As a result, the
vinyl curtain bracketing system in Docking Bay B partially detached and then completely
detached from the concrete between one week and one month later, injuring Mr. Wood.
R 1134:23–1135:13; 1136:1–25; R 423:16–23; 425:1–426:12. The vinyl curtain that
failed, injuring Mr. Wood, was the only curtain with documented damage to the bracket
and concrete. R 1149:3–14. None of the other vinyl curtains failed. Id. Mr. Thain,
KNS’s warehouse manager, concluded from his inspection that the damage caused by a
truck backing into the KNS building at Docking Bay B ultimately caused the vinyl
curtain to fall. R 1142:15–1144:8. The Wood’s expert also believed that the building




2. A Reasonable Person Could Foresee that UPS’s Backing
Hard Into the Building Could Cause Damage to the Building
and Attached Structures Which Might Injure a Person using
the Building.
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the legal requirements on
foreseeability within the element of proximate cause:
What is necessary to meet the test of negligence and proximate cause is that
it be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would occur,
but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of the same general
nature.
Steffensen, 862 P.2d at 1346 (quoting Rees v. Albertson’s Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah
1978)).
In this case, Mr. Wood’s injury falls within the “same general nature” of the type
of injuries a person could be expected to suffer from a tractor-trailer negligently hitting a
building and overhead bracket assembly “hard.” A reasonable jury could foresee that a
large, heavy tractor-trailer striking a building hard or at high speed could cause structural
damage to the building. UPS, through Mr. Keeling, acknowledged that possibility in his
deposition. R 1123:17–1124:4.
A reasonable jury could also foresee that a structurally damaged building could
cause injury to people in that building. For example, a reasonable jury could foresee a
vehicle striking a building might cause the building to collapse or dislodge part of the
building causing injury to people. See Jacobs-Peterson v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 3d
1091, 1098 (D. Utah 2016) (holding that it was generally foreseeable that a fire started by
the army on its own land would spread to other property which would lead to need to
evacuate large animals, whose evacuation could cause injury to people).
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The fact that the building part UPS damaged—the vinyl curtain bracket and the
surrounding concrete—failed one week to a month after the blow rather than immediately
does not take this case out of the foreseeable general harm identified above.
Skillingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah 1977) (“where there is proper
proof of proximate causation, remoteness of time alone will not ordinarily prevent
imputation of liability for a subsequent injury to a prior act of negligence."); see
Holcombe v. NationsBanc Fin. Serv. Corp., 248 VA 445, 448, 450 S.E. 2d 158 (1994)
(denying summary judgment in a negligence case on the issue of foreseeability because
“[t]he fact, stressed by the defendant, that the [two heavy] partitions had remained in the
bathroom for several months without incident does not detract from the foreseeability of
injury occurring, albeit the injury occurred later rather than sooner” after the partition fell
over and injured plaintiff.)
Nor does it matter to the analysis what specific part of the building failed.
Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co. V. Consolidated Freightways, 242 P.2d 563, 565 (Utah
1962) (“Negligence is the proximate cause of damage even though the actor was not able
to see the injury in the precise form in which it occurred, nor to anticipate the precise
damage which would result from his negligence.”). Rather, Mr. Wood’s mechanism of
injury and type of injury fall within the general type of injury which can be expected
from a tractor-trailer hitting and structurally damaging a building; that is, it is generally
foreseeable that a damaged item hanging above an area where people frequently walk
could fall and injure someone walking underneath. See id.
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III. The Woods’ Factual Record Provides Sufficient Evidence for a Jury to
Conclude That KNS’s Action Were Not So Extraordinary in Hindsight to Be
an Intervening Cause.
A. Summary Judgment is Generally Inappropriate to Resolve Proximate Cause
Issues.
“[T]he right to trial by jury is a basic principle of our system that cannot be
allowed to be eroded by improper intrusions on the jury’s prerogative.” Harris v. Utah
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1983). On summary judgment, a court must
resolve all factual disputes in favor of the nonmoving party and adopt all appropriate
inferences. Torrie v. Weber County., 2013 UT 48, ¶ 7, 309 P.3d 216. Summary judgment
is only appropriate if the court determines that “no reasonable factfinder” could find for
the plaintiff on an issue. Salo v. Tyler, 2018 UT 7, ¶ 30, 417 P.3d 581.
Because of this standard, “[s]ummary judgment is generally inappropriate to
resolve negligence claims and should be employed ‘only in the most clear-cut cases.’”
Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, ¶ 27, 171 P.3d 442 (abrogated by Penunuri
v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2017 UT 54, on other grounds). “Proximate cause is a factual
issue that generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law.” Butterfield v. Okubo, 831
P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). “Only in rare cases may a trial judge rule as a matter of law on
the issue of proximate cause.” Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 486.
B. The District Court Erred by Not Applying the Proper Standard for When an
Act Constitutes an Intervening Cause.
The district court, in its ruling on summary judgment, made two key rulings. First,
the district court found UPS’s duty “ended when KNS became aware of the damage UPS
caused to its building.” Second, the district court ruled that UPS was not the proximate
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cause of Mr. Wood’s injury because KNS’s actions were an intervening cause as a matter
of law. In short, the district court found KNS’s knowledge and actions after learning
about the damaged curtain and fixture severed both duty and proximate cause. Without
explicitly saying so, the district court essentially applied an intervening cause test to both
the duty and proximate cause analysis. As discussed below, the district court erred
because it never used the proper standard to establish intervening cause as a matter of
law; but even it if did, the facts of this case are insufficient for judgment as a matter of
law because KNS’s action were not, in hindsight, so “extraordinary” that every juror
must find that KNS’s actions were outside the realm of foreseeability.
1. UPS Has the Burden of Proof on Establishing an Intervening Cause.
UPS has the burden of proof on establishing an intervening cause. Fox v. Brigham
Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 23 n. 3, 176 P.3d 446 (explaining that intervening
cause is “an affirmative defense” upon which the defendant has the burden of proof).
2. Utah Courts Recognize a Subsequent Act Can Only Be an
“Intervening Act” if the Subsequent Act is So Unforeseeable it is in
fact “Extraordinary” or “Highly Extraordinary.”
The Utah courts have steadily moved away from using intervening negligence to
bar negligence claims as matter of law, particularly after Utah adopted comparative
negligence rules which allowed a jury to apportion fault among defendants. 1n 1991, the
Utah Appellate court in Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) aff’d 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993) outlined the high standard a defendant must meet
to establish an intervening act as the sole proximate cause:
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A superseding cause, sufficient to become the proximate cause of the final
result and relieve defendant of liability for his original negligence arises
only when an intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described
with the benefit of hindsight, as extraordinary.
Id. at 488 (citation omitted).
In a more recent case, the Utah Supreme Court in Thayer v. Washington County.
Sch. Distr., 2012 UT 31, 285 P.3d 1142 recognized that the subsequent negligent act
must be “highly extraordinary” to cut off prior negligence:
That conduct would supersede (and cut the causal chain to the
authorization) if the alleged subsequent negligence was sufficiently
unforeseeable—e.g., if “a reasonable man knowing the situation” would
regard the subsequent negligence as “highly extraordinary” and not a
“normal consequence” of the situation created by the authorization.
Id., ¶ 62 (emphasis added) (citing Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d at
219.
C. UPS Has Not Established That KNS’s Actions After UPS Created the
Dangerous Condition Were So Unforeseeable to be “Highly Extraordinary”
or “Extraordinary.”
To grant summary judgment on intervening cause, a court must conclude that a
reasonable jury could only reach one conclusion on intervening cause: KNS’s actions
were so unforeseeable that “with the benefit of hindsight” they may be described as
“extraordinary” or “highly extraordinary.” Thayer, at ¶ 62; Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488.
The facts cannot meet this standard here.
This brief looks specifically at the three facts which UPS relied on below to
establish intervening cause as a matter of law. All of these facts, either alone or
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combined, are foreseeable and do not support a finding as a matter of law that KNS’s
action or inaction was “highly extraordinary.” See Thayer, at ¶ 62.
First, UPS argues that KNS through Mr. Barney saw the damage and then did
nothing to fix the vinyl curtain fixation device once it discovered the damage. That fact is
disputed. Mr. Barney observed the damage. He then retightened one or two of the bolts.
Mr. Barney concluded based on his observation and his attempted repair that the vinyl
bracket was fine. Mr. Barney has provided testimony on this point. Specifically, he
stated that after attempting to fix the bracket that it was “secure enough at least for my
liking.” R 1113:15–1114:4. A jury at trial could conclude Mr. Barney’s attempt to fix
the bracket was foreseeable and certainly not “highly extraordinary.”
Second, UPS pointed to the fact that the same day Mr. Wood was injured, KNS’s
Vice President at the time, Mike Kelly, saw the vinyl curtain bracket hanging down and
he took no action. Mr. Kelly testified that he did not take action “because no one should
have been there and I didn’t think that there was any risk of it hanging down because . . .
there’s a lot of bolts holding it. . . . I never would have thought it would have fallen.”
R 426:17–22. Mr. Kelly’s testimony explains why he took no action at that time.
Although he was ultimately incorrect, Mr. Kelly had two separate reasons for not
immediately fixing the bracket: first, his belief that no one would be working there, and
second, his belief that he did not think “it would have fallen.” A jury at trial could
conclude Mr. Kelly’s actions not to take immediate action were foreseeable and certainly
not “highly extraordinary.”
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Finally, Mr. Wood testified that after he was injured a KNS employee
apologetically remarked that he/she knew the bracket was going to fall and they should
have fixed it. That testimony alone does not warrant summary judgment. Many people
see conditions every day, even dangerous conditions, and yet they do nothing. Again,
this person’s actions in not fixing the vinyl curtain bracketing system was foreseeable not
“highly extraordinary”—they were foreseeable.
UPS is asking this court to hold that KNS’s inaction was so extraordinary that it
was unforeseeable as a matter of law. In fact, UPS’s argument requires this court to rule
that human procrastination is “highly extraordinary.” But procrastination is not “highly
extraordinary,” if anything, it is foreseeable and certainly should not be used as a means
to grant summary judgment. Moreover, as discussed below, a second person’s
knowledge of a prior action can never be used on its own to establish an intervening act
as a matter of law.
The jury needs to make the call on whether KNS’s actions were “highly
extraordinary,” not the court.
D. The Utah Supreme Court Long Ago Rejected the Premise That a Second
Actors’ Knowledge of the Danger Created by a First Actor is an
Intervening Act.
In this case, the district court ruled that UPS’s duty ended when KNS became
aware of the damage to the building and further ruled that KNS discovery of the damage
and failure to fix it constituted an intervening cause. The Utah Supreme court in Harris
v. Utah Transit Authority rejected these bright line distinctions.
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In Harris, the district court directed a verdict against the plaintiff in favor of a
defendant bus driver. 671 P.2d 217, 218. In that case, the driver of a jeep ran into the
back of a bus. The jeep driver’s passenger brought a claim against bus driver. Id. The
lower court concluded the jeep driver’s actions constituted an intervening cause because
the bus was clearly visible in front of the jeep. The Utah Supreme reversed the district
court’s decision. Id. at 222. The Utah Supreme court’s decision recognized that the
district court’s decision relied upon Hillard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 151,
263 P.2d 287, 292 (1953). The court in Hillard held that a subsequent negligent act will
be a superseding cause when the second actor is aware of the dangerous condition created
by the first actor but fails to avoid it. Hillard described this circumstance as follows:
The first situation is where one has negligently created a dangerous
condition [such as parking a truck] and a later actor observed, or
circumstances are such that he could not fail to observe, but negligently
failed to avoid it. . . . In regard to the first situation it is held as a matter of
law that the later intervening act does interrupt the natural sequence of
events and cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial actor.
Hillyard, at 292.
The Harris court expressly overruled this part of Hillard because it created an
improper distinction. Harris, 671 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah 1983) (“To avoid further
confusion in the doctrine of superseding causation in cases such as this, we hereby
overrule the first prong of the Hillyard test as stated in Hillyard, McMurdie, Valesquez,
and Anderson.”) The court added that Hillyard frustrated the purpose of the Comparative
Negligence Statue “by precluding the kind of comparison of fault that a jury ought to
make. The allocation of liability should be made on the basis of the relative culpability 
of both parties." Harris , at 222. 
Under Harris, the fact that KNS knew UPS had damaged the building and created 
a dangerous condition cannot on its own be an intervening cause. Rather, the jury must 
decide how fault should be allocated-exactly why Utah adopted a Comparative Fault 
statute in the first place. The jury, using the Utah Comparative Fault statute, can then 
allocate fault between UPS and KNS as it sees fit. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request this court reverse the lower court's decision and 1) find 
UPS owed a duty to the Plaintiffs and 2) remand the case with instructions for the 
intervening cause issue to go to the jury. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2018. 
Christopher F. Bond 
FABIAN VAN COTT 
& 
Craig T. Jacobsen 
CRAIG T. JACOBSEN, ATTORNEY AT 
LAW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Attorneys for United Parcel Service, Inc. 
The Order of the Court is stated below: , 1• 
'~ ,: 
Dated: November 20, 2017 /s/ MAT~ 
01:20:54 PM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STUART WOOD and LAURIE WOOD 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
KNS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company and UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE, INC., a Delaware corporation 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING defendant united 
parcel services, inc.'s motion for summary 
judgment 
Case No. 160900437 
Judge: Matthew Bates 
(Tier 3) 
This matter came before the Court on October 10, 2017, on Defendant United Parcel 
Service, Inc.'s ("UPS") Motion for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed the briefing and heard 
oral argument, and for good cause appearing, the Court entered the following findings and 
conclusions: 
1. For the purposes ofUPS's Motion for Summary Judgment, the following facts are 
November 20, 2017 01 :20 PM 1 of 5 
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undisputed: 
a. Defendant KNS International, LLC ("KNS") operates a warehouse in Draper, 
Utah, and is responsible for maintaining that warehouse. 
b. KNS receives deliveries to the warehouse by tractor-trailer or other delivery 
truck, and has docking bays for receiving those shipments. 
c. KNS installed vinyl curtains above one or more bay doors by bolting them 
into concrete using a bracket. 
d. 8e¥efa:l w-eek:s to 30 tlttys One week to one month before the injury to Mr. 
Wood, a truck owned by UPS hit docking bay B very hard, cracked the 
cinderblocks where the vinyl curtain was installed, and knocked a couple of 
bolts loose that were holding the curtain bracket in place. 
e. Before the injury in this case, KNS knew of that damage. 
2. Based on the undisputed facts, summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of 
law, because UPS owed no duty to the plaintiffs at the time of injury. UPS's duty ended when 
KNS became aware of the damage UPS caused to its building. At that time, KNS was in a 
superior position to repair the damage and defects to the building, or restrict access to the bay so 
that it could not be used. At this point, UPS had no further duty to people injured by the damage 
it caused to the building. 
3. Summary judgment in favor of UPS is also appropriate because the injury to Mr. 
Wood was not proximately caused by the damage UPS caused to the building. The defective 
property was in the sole possession ofKNS for se¥efa:l vteek:s to 30 tla:ys one week to one month 
November 20, 2017 01 :20 PM 2 of 5 
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before the injury to Mr. Wood occurred. IfKNS was negligent in not repairing the door, or in 
the manner in which it repaired the door, there is intervening negligence by KNS that caused the 
injury to Mr. Wood. Alternatively, ifKNS repaired the door in a manner that was reasonable 
and not negligent, no party's negligence caused the injury to Mr. Wood. Under either scenario, 
UPS did not proximately cause Mr. Wood's injury, and cannot be liable as a matter oflaw. 
4. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of UPS on Plaintiffs' 
claims, which are dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
-------------------- END OF ORDER--------------------
JUDGE'S ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE APPEARS AT THE TOP 
OF 1HE FIRST PAGE OF IBIS DOCUMENT 
4847-5607-9185, V. 1 
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Note from the Court: 
11-20-2017:13:21 :40 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
District 
Salt Lake 
WOOD, STUART, et al. vs. KNS 
INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al. 
Order Granting Defendant United Parcel Service 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
MATTHEW BATES 
Signed with amendments as agreed by the 
parties in strikeout and underline. 
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CRAIG T JACOBSEN for STUART WOOD et al 
JOSEPH E MINNOCK for KNS INTERNATIONAL 
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